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Chapter 5
Phenomenological Simulators of Critical
Infrastructures
Alberto Tofani, Gregorio D’Agostino and José Martí
Abstract The objective of this chapter is to introduce and discuss the main phe-
nomenological approaches that have been used within the CI M&S area.
Phenomenological models are used to analyse the organizational phenomena of the
society considering its complexity (ﬁnance, mobility, health) and the interactions
among its different components. Within CI MA&S, different modelling approaches
have been proposed and used as, for example, physical simulators (e.g. power flow
simulators for electrical networks). Physical simulators are used to predict the
behaviour of the physical system (the technological network) under different con-
ditions. As an example, electrical engineers use different kind of simulators during
planning and managing of network activities for different purposes: (1) power flow
simulators for the evaluation of electrical network conﬁguration changes (that can
be both deliberate changes or results from of the effects of accidents and/or attacks)
and contingency analysis, (2) real time simulators for the design of protection
devices and new controllers. For the telecommunication domain one mat resort to
network trafﬁc simulators as for example ns2/ns3 codes that allow the simulation of
telecommunication networks (wired/wireless) at packet switching level and eval-
uate its performances. Single domains simulators can be federated to analyse the
interactions among different domains. In contrast, phenomenological simulators use
more abstract data and models for the interaction among the different components
of the system. The chapter will describe the main characteristic of some of the main
simulation approaches resulting from the ENEA and UBC efforts in the CIP and
Complexity Science ﬁeld.
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Phenomenological Modelling: “Phenomenological models have been deﬁned in
different, though related, ways. A traditional deﬁnition takes them to be models that
only represent observable properties of their targets and refrain from postulating
hidden mechanisms and the like” [1].
The scope of this chapter is to introduce and discuss phenomenological
approaches for Modelling Analysis and Simulation (MA&S) of systems involving
Critical Infrastructures (CI’s). Phenomenological models provide a means to
analyse the organizational phenomena of society considering its global complexity
(ﬁnance, mobility, health, social, energetics, communications, etc.) and the inter-
actions among its different components. With respect to CI’s, different modelling
approaches have been introduced and used, spanning from very accurate simulators
such as “physical simulators” (e.g. power flow simulators for electrical networks) to
more abstract ones such as I/O models (e.g. Leontief models for ﬁnance).
There is no clear-cut deﬁnition of “phenomenological models”, however they are
normally restricted to those modelling activities based on a massive set of “pa-
rameters” to be fed by the modeller. The opposite of the phenomenological models
being the “ab initio” ones where parameters are limited to a minimum irreducible
set. Alternatively one may qualify phenomenological models as those disregarding
internal functional details, thus focussing of the effective response.
Regardless of the semantic boundaries, any MA&S activity relies on a “con-
ceptualization” (i.e. a formal, possibly, mathematical representation) of the
inspected system. The ﬁrst step of any scientiﬁc approach to a technological system
is its “representation”. It is worth noting that an “elective” representation does not
exist: depending on the commitment, available information, knowledge and com-
putational means, the “most effective” representation (if any) will be different.
The selection of the model and consequently the simulation paradigm depends on
commitment and availability of data. Physical (or Domain) simulators are used to
predict the behaviour of the physical system (the technological network) under
different conditions and hence to take critical decisions or enforce structural
improvements. As an example, the electrical engineers use different kinds of simu-
lators during planning and network management activities depending on their dif-
ferent purposes: power flow simulators are adequate for the evaluation of electrical
network conﬁguration changes (that can be both deliberate changes of the effects of
accidents and/or attacks) and contingency analysis; while real time simulators are
required for the design of protection devices and new controllers. Similarly con-
siderations apply to other energy or goods delivering infrastructures, such as gas,
fuel, water transport and distribution. Concerning the telecommunications domain,
or other non-conservative distribution systems, one may resort to network trafﬁc
simulators, as, for instance ns2/ns3, which allow the assessment of the telecom-
munication network performance for both wired and wireless architectures.
Single domain simulators can be federated to analyse the interactions among
different domains, thus leading to speciﬁc simulation activities, which are covered
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elsewhere in this book. On the other side, phenomenological simulators may use
more abstract data and models for the interaction among the different components
of the system, thus providing the global response on the system (i.e. system of
systems).
Within the phenomenological MA&S activities, we will shortly cover the
approaches underlying the most widespread of them:
• Topological Analyses. Topological and qualitative approaches are suitable for
the identiﬁcation of general characteristics and possibly emergent behaviour of
technological networks. In general they do not require very detailed data input
and their computational effort is limited. As a consequence, these approaches are
suitable for the analysis of general properties of very large networks (e.g.
internet) an provide large size effects which may be hidden by details.
• Input-Output Models. In systems engineering and in economics input-output
models are based on the concept of “blocks” that have a given transfer function
which is expressed with a mathematical formula. The blocks are connected in a
certain topological arrangement. For a given block, the output of the block
depend on the input to the block. These models can be deterministic when the
laws that govern the blocks are well known (e.g., Newton’s law) and the blocks
will always give the same output for the same input. When the laws that
describe the system blocks are not exactly known (or depend on some stochastic
factors), the models can be probabilistic (including those that follow stochastic
laws), in which case there is only a certain expectation of getting some output
for a given input. Among this group it is worth mentioning the Inoperability I/O
Model (IIM) [2, 3] and Dynamic IIM models [4].
• System Dynamics. Input-output models provide the output given the input.
Mathematically, there are two possible states of a system, the steady state and
the transient state. The steady state occurs after the system output settles down
for an input that has settled down. However, if the input changes, the output will
adapt (if stable) to the new input. The trajectory of the system when transi-
tioning from the initial state to the new state depends on the internal dynamics of
the system (“inertia” in physics). The system blocks can be connected to provide
each other with positive or negative feedback loops (control systems theory). In
economics, these models relate production and consumption variables at a
macroscopic level.
• Stochastic Models. In principle all models may be extended to introduce non-
deterministic behaviour. In this respect, one may basically identify two different
approaches. On one side, one may perform deterministic simulations with a
wide range of random boundary conditions [5]; on the other side, the dynamics
of the system may be intrinsically stochastic [6].
• Agents simulation. Agent based-functional modelling paradigms are based on
representations of the system by different components, each behaving according
to given (deterministic or stochastic) rules depending on its status and a limited
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set of features of the components they are related to. Agent-based functional
modelling approaches, in particular, use a description of the system based on the
observed knowledge of how the system behaves under a set of situations.
Agents are given attributes according to their observed behaviour. These attri-
butes play a similar role to the transfer function concept in systems engineering,
but are described by “if-then” statements rather than mathematical formulas.
Agent-based simulation may represent a useful tool to perform exercises, what if
analysis and serious gaming. For instance, agent analysis may allow the opti-
mization of crisis scenarios based on previous expert experience.
• I2SIM combines several of the above methods. It uses agent-based concepts to
relate system blocks that cannot be described by mathematical equations, such
as the operation of a hospital, and mathematical formulas or logical relationships
to describe, for example, the operation of transformer and breaker arrangements
in an electrical substation. In economics Leontief’s production model relates
input resources in a sector with the output of that sector linearized around an
operating point. I2Sim extends this concept by allowing nonlinear relationships
among input resources and output resource and also by including human factors
like tiredness, enthusiasm, and others that are not directly part of the input
resources but that alter the effectiveness of the process.
As already mentioned, in general, the choice of a suitable approach depends on
the quantity and quality of available data, the scale of analysis and the modelling
objective [7, 8]. Different approaches can be integrated in order to build complete
platforms and tools for comprehensive CI M&S and analysis. Figure 1 shows a
possible architecture for a comprehensive modelling, analysis and simulation ap-
proach. This proposed architecture highlights the need to manage a possibly huge
quantity of heterogeneous data and the different analysis that can be performed on
these data. In particular the ﬁgure shows the different phenomenological simulators
that will be described in the following sections and their main modelling and
analysis scope.
The chapter will describe the main characteristics of some of these simulation
approaches, in particular those approaches that have been extensively applied in
different research projects at ENEA and UBC.
Fig. 1 A comprehensive CI M&S platform architecture
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2 Phenomenological Approaches
2.1 Leontief I/O Models
Leontief approaches have been deﬁned mainly for the study of interdependency
effects in economic systems. A Leontief model is an Input-Output model where the
dependencies among different domains (in the original model, economic sectors)
are represented through an input-output matrix to relate the amount of input
resources needed for a given amount of ﬁnished product. The original Leontief
model assumes a linear (or linearized around an operating point) relationship
between the input and the output variables.




The term xi represents the total output of industry or economic sector i, the
coefﬁcient aij represents the dependency between sectors i and j (sector j requires
from sector i an amount of resources represented by the coefﬁcient aij). The term ci
represents the “surplus” from sector i, that is, the output from sector i that is not
needed by the other sectors and, therefore, is available as external output from the
production system. In the context of CI MA&S the Leontief approach has been
extended considering the inoperability of a CI network. The inoperability represents
the expected percentage of a network malfunctioning status. I/O models based on
inoperabilities are commonly referred to as “Interdependence Input/Output Models
(IIM)” and are described in another chapter of this book. The IIM models can be





where the Q’s are components’ inoperabilities, M is the relational matrix, DA is the
disturbance and ciA measures the impact of disturbance on sector j (see also
Sect. 2.1.1). Using this approach it is possible to calculate the inoperabilities of a
system due to any external disturbance DA. Beyond its simplicity this model can be
useful to understand non trivial systems behavior due to the intrinsic complexity of
the system of systems formed by (inter-)dependent CI networks.
In the next section a particular extension adopted in ENEA of the IIM modeling
approach is described.
2.1.1 ENEA Extended Leontief Models
As an enhancement of the IIM approach, a Stochastic Chain evolution law may
replace the Leontief deterministic one, thus creating a more appropriate tool to
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dynamically follow the (stochastic) transition from an equilibrium state to a new
one and possibly mimic the cascading effects triggered by unwilled disturbances.
Moreover, as a variation of the “System of Systems” approach, each network has
not been treated like an holomorphic entity, but its inner structure has been dealt
with. Multiple implementations of the same scenarios at different level of granu-
larity have been compared providing evidence for intrinsic inconsistency of high
level abstraction models disregarding the actual geographic distribution of network
[CRITIS2009].
Indeed, on can extend the former approach to introduce temporal dynamics in
the model:
Qi tþDtð Þ ¼
X
j¼1;::;N
MijQJ tð Þþ ciAðtÞDAðtÞ





hijQJ tð Þdtþ ci tð ÞdDAðtÞ
dDAðtÞ represents the “power” of disturbance (disturbance per unit time) and the




Considering the constraints that external disturbance and the response of the
components are constant and the inoperabilities lie within the [0,…, 1] range in [6]
an explicit solution has been given to the previous system of equations. Figure 2
shows a typical evolution of inoperabilities in a CI networks system of systems. The
inoperabilities are due to an undesired event directly impacting only one compo-
nent in the model (local disturbance). As it can be seen, the fault propagates
affecting other components. After a while the most impacted component is not the
one initially perturbed (box in Fig. 2) as may be expected.
Indeed, the systemic behaviour reflect precisely in the fact that response of the
system does not dependent on local quantities but on its global characteristics.
2.2 System Dynamics
System Dynamics tries to represent the nonlinear behaviour of a complex system
using dynamic stock and flows diagrams. These diagrams are formed by: stocks
representing the entities in the model accumulating or depleting over time and by
flows representing accumulation rates for the related stocks. System dynamics
models include positive and negative feedback loops to relate production and
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consumption variables at a macroscopic level and feedback loops. One of the
famous application of System Dynamics model is the Forrester World Model used
to predict that the limits to growth of the planet. The Forrester World Model is a flat
model (all processes occur in the same layer) that considers the following systems:
food, industrial, population, non-renewable resources, and pollution. Considering
the CIP ﬁeld there are a number of approaches that use System Dynamics (SD in
the following). For instance, in [9] the SD approach is used to assess the impact of
cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures. The methodology compares the behavior of
a complex physical process considering two possible situations: the critical assets in
its normal behavior and the critical assets under cyber-attack. In this way, the
methodology can be used to assess the signiﬁcance of the considered cyber asset.
The SD approach has been used also in the framework of the CRISADMIN
(CRitical Infrastructure Simulation of ADvanced Models on Interconnected
Networks resilience) EU project [10] that aims to develop a tool to evaluate the
impact of large catastrophic events and/or terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures.
The tool is a DSS useful for the assessment and management of critical events.
The DSS objective is to simulate preventive measures and emergency responders’
activities during an emergency. The DSS is available in the form of a prototype and it
was used in four test cases: United Kingdom Flood (2007), Central Eastern Europe
Flood (2002), Madrid terrorist attack (2004), and London terrorist attack (2005).
2.3 i2SIM
The I2Sim (Integrated Interdependencies Simulator) was developed at The
University of British Columbia to extend the capabilities of large engineering
systems simulation by incorporating phenomena that cannot be expressed in terms
of mathematical transfer functions [11]. For example, the operation of a hospital in
terms of patients accepted per hour cannot be capture by physical equations, but it is
Fig. 2 A example the typical
evolution of inoperabilities
upon an undesired event
impacting on the onset on one
component only (red line)
5 Phenomenological Simulators of Critical Infrastructures 91
known to the hospital manager and can be captured in an input-output table that is
called an HRT (human readable table).
Figure 3 shows an example of an HRT for a hospital emergency unit.
In the table, the full operation of the hospital, 20 patients per hour, is achieved
when the electricity is 100 kW, the water is 2000 l/h, there are 4 doctors and 8
nurses, there is no physical damage (for example, due to an earthquake) and the
doctors are not tired. In the scenario (circled values), there is no lack of electricity or
doctors, but there are limited resources in terms of nurses, physical integrity, some
tiredness of the doctors, and mostly lack of water. The output in this example is
limited to 10 patients per hour due to the lack of enough water.
Figure 4 shows a simple sample system for i2Sim. The production units in i2Sim
are called “cells” (Fig. 5a) that receive inputs (physical or modiﬁers) and produce
Fig. 3 HRT for a hospital emergency unit
Fig. 4 i2Sim ontology illustrated in simple system
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one output. Other basic ontological elements include the connection among cells
“channels” (Fig. 5b) that deliver the tokens from one cell to another (Fig. 5b).
Channels may introduce losses and delays in the delivery of the tokens. The
channels constitute an equivalent of the token transportation system. For example,
there are many pieces of water pipes connecting the water pump station and the
hospital, but a single equivalent channel can capture the water losses due to cracks
in the pipes. At the output of the cell, there is a “distributor” that splits the output of
the cell into the portions (ratios) delivered to the other cells. How the split ratios are
determined is a “decision” made in a separate layer outside the system in the ﬁgure.
The split of the outputs at the distributors is fundamental to optimize the total
system objective, e.g. save lives during a disaster.
The fundamental problem during a natural disaster, cyber-attack, or system
failure, is that the resources that the system uses during normal operation will be
limited because of the damage caused by the event. The decisions at the distributors
are made by optimizers, either of mathematical or human type. Figure 6 shows the
HRT for an electrical system substation that normally delivers 60 MW of elec-
tricity. If one of the two transformers is damaged then the output will be limited to
30 MW and a decision will have to be made as to which customers will receive the
Fig. 5 An I2Sim cell (a) and channel (b)
Fig. 6 HRT model for an
electrical system substation
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available power. This decision should be made in terms of the importance of the
cells that will receive this power within the global objective function of the system.
For example, during a disaster the global objective will be to save human lives. It
then makes sense to send all the available power to the hospitals. However, if the
water pump stations do not receive power, the hospital will not be able to operate,
not because of the lack of electricity but because of the lack of water. The allocation
of the available electricity, water, and other resources is a mathematical opti-
mization problem that changes dynamically in time as system repairs are made and
further damage occurs. The i2Sim framework allows the incorporation of physical,
cyber-physical, organizational, and human variables within the context of opti-
mizing the global system’s objective.
I2Sim follows a layered approach (Fig. 7) at integrating physical and
non-physical phenomena. The layers illustrated in Fig. 7 include: the Physical
Production Layer (similar to Leontief’s production layer, expanded to include
nonlinear relationships and human factors), the Geographical Damage Layer (that
will include the calculations of the damage caused by and earthquake, for example),
the Management and Organizational Layer (that will include the policies and
procedures that regulate who makes what decisions), the Cyber-system Layer (that
includes the signals that control the actions to actuate the physical equipment and
the communications among managers and responders), and the People’s Well-being
Layer (that includes, for example, the results of the actions of the system in terms of
consequences on quality of life).
I2Sim’s solution engine has the capability of handling very large systems so that
the degree of detail in the sub-systems and their interactions is limited mostly by the
degree of resolution of the data available and the uncertainty of the values of these
data.
Fig. 7 i2Sim multi-layered framework
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Structurally, i2Sim follows the Multi-Area Thévenin Equivalent (MATE) con-
cept developed for the simulation of large power systems [12]. The main predicate
of MATE is that a large system is made up of smaller subsystems with links among
them. Algorithmically, the MATE solution proceeds in several parallel/sequential
stages: ﬁrst the subsystems (of lower dimensionality than the full system) are solved
separately (possibly eventually simultaneously in parallel processors). Then the
dimensionality of each subsystems is reduced down to equal the number of links
that connect the particular subsystem to the other subsystems (Thévenin equiva-
lents). Then the Thévenin equivalents are brought together to form the
links-subsystem of dimensionality equal to the total number of links. The links
subsystem is now solved. The solution will give the flow in and out of the links
connecting the subsystems. Finally, the individual subsystems are “updated” with
the links solution. This concept has been generalized in i2Sim for the general
framework of Fig. 7.
In the sample system of Fig. 4, the source resources are provided by utilities that
may constitute a complete infrastructure subsystem, for example, the electrical grid,
the water system, the transportation system, the telecommunications system, and
others. Similarly, the outputs of some of the i2Sim cells can be given out to other
infrastructures in an action that is opposite to that of a source, that is, into a
load/sink. Each one of these subsystems can be modelled with a separate simulator
(Fig. 8) which is best suited to the scenario under analysis. These “federation of
external simulators” is coupled to the i2Sim “links subsystem”. The links subsys-
tem is then optimized according to a global objective function in a process that
involves the updating of the external subsystem, as described for MATE.
The federated simulators in Fig. 8 are coupled together through software
adapters into a common service bus. The simulation proceeds along the time line
using a master clock controller (Fig. 9).
Fig. 8 Federated source/load simulators
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The federated simulators in Fig. 8 are coupled together through software
adapters into a common service bus. The simulation proceeds along the time line
using a master clock controller (Fig. 9). The different subsystems that constitute the
integrated i2Sim framework will have different response times (different “time
constants”). For example, the supply of electricity can be controlled within seconds
or milliseconds, while the water system may take a few minutes, and the organi-
zational system of a hospital or emergency response management unit may take
longer. To coordinate these different response rates, i2Sim uses multirate concepts
developed in signal processing and simulation theory. The MATE solution
framework allows for the integration of multirate concepts using interpolation and
decimation techniques to maintain the synchronicity of the solution.
In addition to the optimization of resources allocation during disasters man-
agement, i2Sim can also be applied to evaluate the resiliency of a city or a region.
In the case, for example, of a “smart city”, the recovery of the system of infras-
tructures after a natural disaster, cyber attack, or equipment failure should be
managed in such a way that the most critical services are restored ﬁrst. The overall
objective in this application is to maximize the well-being of the citizens and this
well-being can be mapped into a resilience index [13].
Figure 10 illustrates an example of a city where some basic infrastructures,
electricity, water, and ICT have suffered damage and their delivered resources are
limited. In this case the system objective function is to maintain the well-being of
the city residents. We deﬁne a Well-Being Index (WBI) (“wee-bi”) using an HRT
that shows the relative importance of the availability of certain services, in this
example, electricity, water, general city services (banking, food, etc.), and ICT
(internet, etc.). This is a subjective index that will depend on the area of the city and
the country and will require the collaboration of social scientists and psychologists
to deﬁne. The global objective of the optimization problem is to maximize the
resiliency index based on this HRT table. Notice that the WBI can be highly
nonlinear. This example further illustrates the capability of i2Sim to incorporate
human factors into the system solution.
Fig. 9 Multirate time controller
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The HRT tables in i2Sim provide the flexibility to incorporate physical and
non-physical factors into the same solution framework. In addition, since these
tables may have a limited number of rows, the detail in the description can be
adapted to the amount/uncertainty of knowledge for a given cell entity. The sim-
plest HRT would have two rows indicating that the cell is either operating at full
capacity (100%), or is totally non-operative (0%). In a more detailed analysis, with
higher granularity of information, the number of rows would be larger. The tables in
Fig. 10 have different granularities. The combinatorial solution of i2Sim uses the
discrete HRT tables to ﬁnd the optimum combination of rows across all cells in the
system that maximizes the output objective function over a certain time scenario.
Two optimization methods that have been successfully applied include reinforce-
ment learning [14] and ordinal optimization [7].
In very large systems, however, with a large number of cells, distributors, and
other components, a combinational solution can have very high dimensionality. An
alternative solution to this problem is to convert the discrete relationships in the
HRTs into continuous analytical functions. Figure 11 illustrates the analytical-i2Sim
Fig. 10 City resiliency and well-being index (WBI)
Fig. 11 Analytical-i2Sim
solution
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version. In this version, the columns of the HRTs are synthesized using continuous
hyperbolic function approximations.
With the HRTs represented by functions h(t), a system of equations can be
formed where each cell contributes an equation of the form
yi ¼ min q1ðx1Þ; q2ðx2Þ; q3ðx3Þf g
where qi is the function that approximates column i in the HRT. The qj functions are
assumed to be linearly independent. The cell equations can now be combined with
the distributor equations, and the equations for the other components in the i2Sim
ontology, to form a system of nonlinear equations that can be solved using a
Newton-Raphson algorithm. The trajectory of the system towards maxima and
minima can be tracked using the associated Hessian matrix for gradient-type
methods of optimization. This work is currently under development. A variation of
this analytical method, that involves a ﬁrst-order approximation of the qj functions
combined with a linear programming algorithm, has also been developed. This
version can achieve orders of magnitude faster solutions and can be used as a good
ﬁrst-order approximation to many problems or as a starting base-point for systems
with stronger nonlinearities. The optimization along a time line of the event can be
obtained using machine learning techniques such as reinforcement learning [14].
3 Topological Analysis
Electrical power transmission and distribution networks, telecommunication (data,
voice) networks, roads, oil and gas pipelines etc. are objects that can be easily
represented as graphs where nodes represent different CIs components and the links
represent their connections (e.g. logical, physical). In this respect there is a large
deal of efforts in applying ideas and methods of Complex Systems (CS) to them,
particularly to study their vulnerability and their response to fault. The main aim is
to increase their resilience and to reduce the effects that a fault, regardless of its
accidental or intentional origin, might produce. In the following some basic deﬁ-
nitions of the graph theory.
A graph G ¼ ðV ;EÞ is composed by a set of nodes V and a set of edges E. An
edge e ¼ ðvi; vjÞ 2 E connects the vertices vi; vj 2 V . A graph may be undirected,
meaning that there is no distinction between the two vertices associated with each
edge, or its edges may be directed from one vertex to another. A graph may be un-
weighted or weighted. In the latter case each e 2 E has associated a real number we.
The degree of a node is the number of links entering (and/or leaving) from it.
A graph can be fully represented by an Adjacency matrix A. For example, the
Fig. 12 shows a graph example and its adjacency matrix.
The simplest indicator of how intensely a node is connected to the rest of the net
is its degree deﬁned as the number of nodes it is connected to or, equivalently, the
total number of incoming and outgoing links entering or exiting from it:





The degree distribution P(k) is introduced deﬁned as the (relative or absolute)
frequency of nodes of degree k. According to this property a graph can be classiﬁed as
regular, random or scale free. Figure 13 shows the difference between the node degree
distribution of random and scale-free graphs. In Fig. 14 two examples of graphs are
depicted (Fig. 15).
The functional form of P(k) contains relevant information on the nature of the
network under study. It has widely shown that “real” spontaneously-grown net-
works (i.e. grown with no external design or supervision) tend to show a power-law
decaying P(k). In this type of networks (named “scale-free” networks), loosely
connected nodes (leaves) and highly connected ones (hubs) co-exist. Scale-free
networks are known to exhibit a high level of robustness against random faults of
their elements, while showing a large vulnerability related to the removal of speciﬁc
components: hub removals induce dramatic impacts on the graph connectivity.
“Random” graphs, in turn, are those whose P(k) has a poissonian proﬁle. The
“random graph” approximation, although being used to map most of “real” net-
works, has been discovered to represent very few real systems [15].
Different statistical indices may be introduced to describe the degree distribution.
For instance it is possible to compute the range of the node degrees using the
Fig. 12 A graph example and its related adjacency matrix
Fig. 13 Random and scale free node degree distribution
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minimum and maximum degree in the network. Then we have the average degree
and variance deﬁned as follows:










deg2s  degh i
 2
Fig. 14 Example of random (or exponential) and scalar-free graphs [21]
Fig. 15 The CIPCast workflow
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To better describe the topological structure of a network it is possible to intro-
duce the conditional degree distribution that is the probability that of a node of
degree k0 has a neighbor of degree k:




The last coefﬁcient that will be reported in this work is related to the degree
correlation. In particular when nodes of high correlation tend to be linked to nodes
of high correlation, the net is said to be assortative, vice versa when high degree
nodes tend to be linked to low degree ones the net is said to be disassortative. This


























In [16] the authors analyzing the diffusive dynamics of epidemics and of distress
in complex networks shows that disassortative networks exhibit a higher epi-
demiological threshold and are therefore easier to immunize, while in assortative
networks there is a longer time for intervention before epidemic/failure spreads.
Then, the robustness of complex networks is related to the its assortative
coefﬁcient.
Using deﬁnition coming from the graph theory and different topological indices,
several possible analysis are performable on a CI network. The MOTIA project [15]
used the topological approach to study the main characteristics of ICT networks
consisting of a set of devices or components (server, bridges etc.) connected by
cables or wireless channels (links). The next table summarizes the possible prop-
erties that can be analyzed using the topological analysis approach [MOTIA].
Given a graph representation of an ICT network it is possible to calculate the
topological indices reported in Table 1 to analysis the network characteristics. One
of the most important property to consider is represented by the network robustness.
The robustness indicates to what extent net topological properties are stable against
damages. For example, there are two basic concepts of connectivity for a graph,
which can be used to model network robustness: node-robustness and link-ro-
bustness. The “node robustness” of a net is the smallest number of nodes whose
removal results in a disconnected or a single-node graph. Conversely, the “link
robustness” is the smallest number of links whose removal results in a disconnected
graph [17]. In [15] the authors uses the described topological indices to analysis the
internet network.
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4 A CI MA&S Platform for Complex and Large Scenarios
This chapter describes the approaches used in the framework of the EU-FP7
CIPRNet project http://www.ciprnet.eu. One of the main technological outcomes of
the CIPRNet project is a DSS, named CIPCast that is able to provide a 24/7 service
to CI operators and emergency (crisis) decision-makers providing a continuous risk
assessment of CI elements due to natural threats. CIPCast has been designed and
Table 1 Topological indices
Connectivity A graph is connected if all nodes are
connected (or reachable) each other
Distance The distance d(i, j) between two vertices (i
and j) belonging to a connected part of a
graph is the length of one of the shortest
paths between them. The distance is
symmetric (d(i, j = d(j, i)) only when the
net is undirected
Eccentricity The eccentricity e(i) of a node i in a
connected graph G is the maximum of the
distances from i to any other node
Diameter The diameter diam (G) of a connected part
G of graph is the maximum eccentricity
over all its nodes





The Wiener index of a node i, denoted by
W(v) is the sum of distances between it and
all the others







The wiener index of a graph G, denoted by









Centrality Relevance of a node to provide some type
of property to the others
Betweenness For a node i this index represents the sum of
the fractions of paths connecting all pairs
passing throw it. The number of paths
connecting two different nodes j and k, will
be indicated by njk while the number of
such paths passing through the node i will






Clustering The clustering coefﬁcient c provides a
parameter to measure the connectivity
inside the neighborhood of a give node. In
general, nodes of low clustering values






Nlinksi represents the number of
links among the neighbors of the
i-th site
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implemented to allow the prediction and rapid assessment of the consequences of a
crisis scenario in an “operational” mode of operation (24/7). CIPCast, however, can
also be used in an “off-line” mode for producing risk analysis starting from syn-
thetically produced events (rather than truly occurring ones) or from synthetically
produced damages (rather than by damages produced by true or synthetic events).
In the former case, we will talk of “event simulator”, in the latter of “damage
simulator”. One of the main components of CIPCast (when acting in the “opera-
tional” mode) is a continuous process (running on a 24/7 basis) realizing the Risk
Assessment Loop, RAL in the following (as shown in Fig. 15). Starting from the
prediction of the occurrence of natural hazards and of their strengths, RAL ﬁrst
estimates the expected damages, then transforms the damages into effects that they
will produce on all Services (carried out by CI) which will be reduced (or switched
off) and, subsequently, estimating the consequences that the loss (or reduction) of
Services would have on relevant areas of societal life. The tool can also be used to
“weigh” the efﬁcacy of the proposed mitigation and healing actions and thus being
a valuable tool for supporting emergency managers e.g., CI operators, Civil
Protection and ﬁre brigades.
This section describes a speciﬁc RAL workflow instance that has been imple-
mented for the natural hazard risk assessment of electrical distribution networks. In
particular, the described workflow is related to the heavy rain risk assessment of the
electrical distribution network of Rome. The workflow has been implemented in
cooperation with the Italian RoMA project partner ACEA that is the main electrical
utility in Rome. Speciﬁcally, the section will show how the different phenomeno-
logical simulators for CIs can be used as the building bricks of different phases of
the workflow and in general, for the realization of additional services for the DSS
end users.
The ﬁrst challenge to face during the development of such kind of platforms is the
acquisition of CI networks data. In order to perform a comprehensive risk analysis
these data need to be related to the different aspects involved in the management of
the CI networks. Indeed, the basic requirement to build comprehensive models and,
successively, comprehensive simulation and analysis is to dispose of data related to
CI networks physical components and network management procedures (consider-
ing the differences between the procedures adopted in normal state and during a
crisis). Then, the next step for any MA&S activity is the “conceptualization” of the
inspected systems and to build formal representations. In [18] the authors propose
UML extensions (meta-models) in order to deﬁne the different aspects of an
infrastructure organization and behaviour as ownership and management, structure
and organization, resources, risk and relationship. The CEML language proposed in
[19] is a graphical modelling language allowing domain experts to build formally
grounded models related to crisis and emergency scenarios. In general the infras-
tructure scale of analysis describes the level of granularity the infrastructure inter-
dependencies are analysed and which kind of approaches can be used in the analysis.
At a high abstraction level the interdependent networks can be modelled and anal-
ysed from the system of systems point of view. At this level of granularity it is
possible to build graph models or the IIM. In the former case, the topological
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approach can be applied to compute the different coefﬁcients, indices described in
Table 1 to assess for example the robustness of the networks or possible components
vulnerabilities. In the later case IIM models can be used to perform failure propa-
gation analysis. Then, going to a lower abstraction level and thus requiring more
detailed data, it is possible to use agent-based approaches or I2SIM to perform
networks and crisis scenario analysis considering functional properties of network
components, network management procedures and phenomenological factors that
cannot be represented by more abstract models (see Fig. 17). In particular, CIPCast
includes the RECSim simulator [20] (as shown in Fig. 16) that allows the simulation
of the electrical distribution network management procedures and its interdepen-
dencies with the telecommunication domain. Indeed, electrical distribution operators
use SCADA systems to perform remote operations (tele-control) on the electrical
grid to ensure a constant and efﬁcient energy supply to the consumers. Tele-control
operations bi-directionally couple telecommunication and electrical networks: faults
in one network produce effects, which in turn reverberate on the others. RECSim
assesses the correct tele-control operations needed for the restoring of the electrical
grid based on topological properties of the electrical substations and the Telecom
nodes. A crucial approximation introduced in CIPCast is the decoupling of the
electrical and telecom systems form all the other infrastructures. These networks
should be considered highly dependent and tightly linked; for this reason, their
behaviour and their mutual perturbation dynamics occur in times, which are much
shorter than those characterizing the perturbation dynamics for other infrastructures.
As such, electro-telecom dynamics are resolved at ﬁrst, in a time scale typical of their
interaction (from a few seconds to a few hours) by keeping the other infrastructures
substantially unperturbed. Once the electro-telecom perturbation dynamics has been
Fig. 16 The CIPCast risk analysis service workflow
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solved, the resulting electro-telecom situation (inoperability) is introduced in the
complete infrastructures setting in order to estimate the further perturbation pro-
duced on the other infrastructures (using I2SIM).
5 Conclusion
The document describes the results of several years of research at ENEA and UBC
in the ﬁeld of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Complexity Science. In partic-
ular, the document describes some phenomenological simulators for complex
systems of CI’s and highlights how these tools can be considered as fundamental
pillars of a CI MS&A platform. This framework allows various kind of analyses for
different end users and, in general, for different objectives. Regardless of the
analysis objective, the ﬁrst step is to build a valid and effective representation of the
inspected system. It is worth noting once again that an “elective” representation
does not exist: depending on the commitment, available information, knowledge
and computational means, the “most effective” representation (if any) will be dif-
ferent. Therefore, different phenomenological approaches are currently applied. The
paper proposes a general framework and platform architectures to integrate the
main components of any CI MA&S approach. It further shows the details of the
CIPCast and the I2sim platforms that are compliant with the proposed general
paradigm. The CIPCast platform, developed within the CIPRnet project, is a
Decision Support System providing a 24/7 service to CI operators and emergency
(crisis) decision-makers providing a continuous risk assessment of CI elements due
to natural threats. One of the main components of CIPCast (when acting in the
Fig. 17 From knowledge to simulation
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“operational” mode) is a continuous process (running on a 24/7 basis) realizing the
Risk Assessment Loop (RAL). Within the RAL, an agent based simulator
(RECSim) developed by ENEA and the I2SIM simulator have been used allowing
the simulation of the electrical distribution network management procedures
(considering the interdependencies between the electrical and the telecommunica-
tion domain) and, once the resulting electro-telecom situation (inoperability) has
been assessed, the further perturbation produced on the other infrastructures is
assessed using I2SIM. In the future, as more technological infrastructures data will
be available for a speciﬁc area, CIPCast will be enriched using complete system of
systems representation of the (inter)-dependent networks. Thereby, all other
approaches described in the document, as for example topological ones and IIM
models, will be available in real time to perform different analysis as failure
propagation and vulnerability analysis. CIPCast can be used to discover intrinsic
vulnerabilities of the technological networks (i.e. vulnerabilities that depend on how
components are connected to others of the same or different infrastructures).
Ultimately, CIPCast will result in a comprehensive decision support system
also allowing for investments planning to improve resilience and mitigate the risk.
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